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Dixon: Montana's Law of Causation

COMMENT

MONTANA'S LAW OF CAUSATION: HISTORY,
ANALYSIS AND A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
Sarah A. Dixon*
I. INTRODUCTION

The element of causation is typically the most significant
source of contention in negligence cases. Despite its integral role
in negligence law for nearly two centuries, the element of causation enjoys no clear agreement as to the "best" formula for application.' In Montana, cases reported in the past ten years reflect
numerous changes in causation law. In an attempt to correlate
pattern jury instructions with this ongoing change, the Montana
Supreme Court Commission on Civil Jury Instructions (MPI
Commission) remolded the causation instructions twice in the
past six years. Nevertheless, the measures taken by the Montana Supreme Court and the MPI Commission remain controversial in the legal community. Disagreement has created an arena
for jury instruction battles among attorneys, and unstable guidelines for judges to determine which instructions to give. Occasionally, the fluctuating law and inconsistent practices have
resulted in confused or misled juries. For example, a recent Montana jury was so confused by the causation jury instruction that
the foreperson asked the bailiff for a legal dictionary to check the
meaning of the word "proximate."2 The Montana Supreme Court,

* The author is grateful to Larry E. Riley for his suggestion of this topic and
support through its completion, Co-Editor in Chief Jason P. Loble for his criticism,
time and enthusiasm, and Peter Dixon for his encouragement and helpful perspectives from a California courtroom.
1.
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41,
at 263 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988).
2. Allers v. Riley, 273 Mont. 1, 901 P.2d 600 (1995).
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disagreeing with the district court, held that the defendants were
entitled to a new trial due to jury misconduct.'
In the summer of 1995, I solicited information from several
Montana attorneys and judges, many of whom are or were members of the MPI Commission. Regarding the issue of how to instruct juries on causation, the following concerns were widespread:
* the lack of a universal understanding of Montana's law
on causation;
* the tactical advantages taken by plaintiffs' and
defendants' lawyers because of the widespread ambiguity; and
* the need for clear jury instructions that correspond
appropriately with the law.4
In response to these concerns, this Comment attempts to
clarify Montana's causation law and propose corresponding jury
instructions. Part II traces the developments in Montana's law of
causation. Part III examines the history and general characteristics of the negligence elements applicable to Montana's problems
with causation. This Part initially sets forth the fundamental
concepts present in all negligence cases, and then specifically
examines cause-in-fact, proximate cause, and duty. Part IV provides an analysis of Montana's law of causation during the Kitchen Krafters' era. This Part begins with an evaluation of how
Montana's two-tiered approach to the causation element comported with the fundamental concepts of all negligence cases.
Next, each tier is analyzed separately, with particular attention
to the interplay and overlap among cause-in-fact, proximate
cause and duty. Also within Part IV, an analysis of Montana's
common law during the Kitchen Krafters era will expose the
weaknesses and problematic patterns in Montana's approach to
causation. Part V proposes solutions to the problems identified in
Part IV, and includes proposed jury instructions for the element
of causation. Part VI analyzes the most recent Montana causa-

3. Id. at 9, 901 P.2d at 605. While bailiff misconduct was also alleged, the
court specified that jury misconduct alone provided sufficient grounds for a new trial.
Id. at 5, 901 P.2d at 603.
4. The following members of the MPI Commission contributed to the compilation of this list: L. Randall Bishop, Leonard H. Langen, Gary Graham, Jim Regnier,
Douglas J. Wold, Stuart Kelner, and Richard Cebull. Practitioners Ward Taleff and
Larry Riley also contributed their ideas and concerns.
5.
Kitchen Krafters v. Eastside Bank of Montana, 242 Mont. 155, 789 P.2d
567 (1990).
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tion case, Busta v. Columbus Hospital Corporation,6 and con-

cludes that the solutions offered in Part V would be preferable to
those provided by the Busta decision.
II.

DEVELOPMENT OF CAUSATION IN MONTANA

The following discussion traces Montana's landmark changes
in the substantive definition of causation and how the pattern
jury instructions reflect these changes. It is necessary to present
this overview for a complete understanding of how the law of
causation developed into its present state. This overview will
reveal that Montana's current causation test developed from a
single test to a two-tiered test, in which distinct aspects of causation were analyzed separately.
In the past, the courts of Montana instructed juries on causation using an instruction from the Montana Jury Instruction
Guide. This instruction, commonly known as MJIG 15.00, read:
"W[t]he proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in a
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new and
independent cause, produces the injury, and without which it
would not have occurred."7 This test directed plaintiffs to prove
an unbroken chain of events as a method for determining proximity of the cause. This method has traditionally been called the
"direct cause" test, because the chain of events is expected to
lead directly to the cause.8 The last phrase of the test indicates
that a proximate cause is one "without which the injury would
not have occurred," language that generally defines the "but for"
test, the predominant factual test for cause-in-fact.9 The language of the MJIG 15.00 instruction demonstrates that Montana
law, at that time, did not distinguish between cause-in-fact and
proximate cause as two separate subelements." Rather, the test
melded these subelements under the name of "proximate cause."
While currently most jury instruction issues relate to the
scope and definition of proximate cause, most problems with the
MJIG 15.00 causation instruction originally arose from the "but
for" portion of the test. Generally, for a defendant to meet the

6.
7.

Mont. __, 916 P.2d 122 (1996).
MONTANA JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDE (Cvi)
__

15.00 (emphasis added); see also

Young v. Flathead County, 232 Mont. 274, 757 P.2d 772 (1988), for an application of
this jury instruction.
8. Milwaukee & Saint Paul Ry. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 474 (1876) (applying the "direct cause" test).
9.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 41, at 265.
10. See Young, 232 Mont. at 282,- 757 P.2d at 777.
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requirements of the "but for" test, the plaintiff has to show that
his injury would not have occurred but for the defendant's conduct. Conversely, if the plaintiffs injury would have occurred
regardless of the defendant's conduct, this conduct was not the
cause-in-fact of the plaintiffs injury.1
Situations inevitably arose in which an injury would have
happened regardless of the defendant's conduct, yet the
defendant's negligent conduct was sufficient to cause or greatly
contribute to the result. For example, in Kyriss v. State,12 a
prisoner named Frank Templin developed gangrene from an
infected ingrown toenail. 3 As a result, Templin's leg was amputated at the knee. 4 Although the prison doctors were negligent
in not discovering the gangrene, Templin had a pre-existing
circulatory problem, which increased the spreading of the infection. 5 The court held that under MJIG 15.00, the doctors would
not have been responsible because their negligence was not the
"but for" cause of his damage; Templin's arteriosclerosis would
have caused his leg to be amputated regardless of the doctor's
conduct.16
When the Montana Supreme Court adopted the "substantial
factor" test, it qualified it as a rare replacement for the "but for"
test. 7 The "substantial factor" test was to be applied in situations when the "but for" test would release defendants from
liability, even though they could have been responsible to a significant degree. 8 Currently, if this situation arises, the "substantial factor" test essentially requires that the defendant's conduct was more probably than not a contributing factor. 9
In 1989, the MPI Commission met in an attempt to clarify
and simplify the MJIG 15.00 instruction. The Commission did
not intend to change MJIG 15.00's statement of the law by deleting clauses and words like "proximate" from the former instruction. 0 Rather, the Commission was apparently concerned with
11.

Id.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

218 Mont. 162, 707 P.2d 5 (1985).
Kyriss, 218 Mont. at 165, 707 P.2d at 7.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 167, 707 P.2d at 8.
See Rudeck v. Wright, 218 Mont. 41, 709 P.2d 621 (1985).
Rudeck, 218 Mont. at 53, 709 P.2d at 628.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 41, at 44 (Supp. 1988).

20.

From the "Commission Notes" to MONTANA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS

(CIVIL) 2.07, 2.08 (repealed and replaced by 2.06 in 1991). The Montana Supreme
Court recently suggested substantial reinstatement of these instructions. See infra
text accompanying note 189.
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recent developments in the "substantial factor" test for concurring causes, and accordingly split the causation instructions into
single and multiple causes as follows:
a.

for a single cause:
"The defendant's conduct is a cause of the (injury/death/damage) if it helped produce it and if the
(injury/death/damage)
would not have occurred with21
out it."

b.

for multiple causes:
"A legal cause of the (injury/death/damage) is a cause
22

which is a substantial factor in bringing it about."

c.

for "those cases where the chain of causation is in issue

(e.g., where there is an allegation of an independent inter-

vening cause) ...
[t]he defendant's conduct is a cause of the (injury/death/damage) if, in a natural and continuous sequence, it helped produce it and if the (injury/death/damage)
would not have occurred without
23
it."
Although the "chain of causation" language of MJIG 15.00
was not criticized in case law at that time, the Commission decided to replace this language with the words "helped produce it"
for the single cause instruction. 2' The result of the 1989 revi-

sion suggests limiting a chain of causation analysis to situations
in which independent intervening causes are alleged.25
In the 1990 decision of Kitchen Krafters v. Eastside Bank of

Montana,2 the Justices of the Montana Supreme Court expressly disapproved of these instructions and decided that a better
approach would be dividing the causation element into separate
cause-in-fact and proximate cause tests. 27 Accordingly, the court
in Kitchen Krafters specifically adopted the two-tiered approach

to causation; the jury was instructed to find cause-in-fact first,
then proximate cause. 8
21.
22.
23.

MONTANA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL) 2.08 (1989).
MONTANA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL) 2.07 (1989).
MONTANA PATIERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CrviL) 2.08 (1989).

24. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
25. For a discussion about the problems with this kind of categorization, see
infra notes 219-27.
26. 242 Mont. 155, 789 P.2d 567 (1990).
27. Kitchen Krafters, 242 Mont. at 167, 789 P.2d at 574.
28. Id. Two years before the Kitchen Krafters decision, the Montana Supreme
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The second change the court made in Kitchen Krafters related to the second tier, proximate cause. By discarding the language of MPI 2.07 and 2.08 (and of MJIG 15.00), the court not
only reintroduced the jury to the word "proximate," but provided
a new test for proximate cause. The Kitchen Krafters test for
causation read:
In order for the defendant's negligence.., to be the proximate
cause of the plaintiffs injury, it must appear from the facts and
circumstances surrounding the accident.., that the defendant
as an ordinarily prudent person, could have foreseen that the
plaintiffs injury would be the natural and probable consequence of the wrongful act.'
After the Kitchen Krafters decision, the "foreseeability" test was
integrated as the dominant test for finding proximate cause in
Montana. 0 Problematically, "foreseeability" is also a method of
determining the scope of a defendant's duty in Montana."
Therefore, the use of the "foreseeability" test within the proximate cause test creates confusion and calls into question the role
of the duty element.
In 1991, the MPI Commission revisited causation jury instructions. Their goal was to synchronize the pattern instruction
with the holding of Kitchen Krafters." The resulting instruction
read as follows:
The Defendant is liable if his negligence is the cause in
fact and proximate cause of Plaintiff's [injury/death/damage].

Court distinguished cause-in-fact and proximate cause in Young v. Flathead County,
232 Mont. 274, 757 P.2d 772 (1988), holding that the plaintiff must "prove first that
defendant's act is a cause in fact of irjury and then that the injury is the direct or
indirect result, proximately caused by the negligent act."
Id. at 282, 757 P.2d at 777; see also Thelen v. City of Billings, 238 Mont. 82, 86,
776 P.2d 520, 522-23 (1989) (following Young for a similar holding).
29. Kitchen Krafters, 242 Mont. at 169, 789 P.2d at 575 (emphasis added).
30. See, e.g., Logan v. Yellowstone County, 263 Mont. 218, 222, 868 P.2d 565,
567 (1994) (holding that "[p]roximate cause is analyzed in terms of foreseeability");
see also Gibby v. Noranda Minerals, 273 Mont. 420, 430, 905 P.2d 126, 132 (1995)
(holding that proximate cause may be found "if it appears from the facts and circumstances surrounding the incident that an ordinarily prudent person could have reasonably foreseen that injury or damage would be a natural and probable consequence
of the conduct").
31. See, e.g., Mang v. Eliasson, 153 Mont. 431, 458 P.2d 777 (1969).
32. Interview with Jim Regnier, Member of the MPI Commission, Missoula, MT
(July 19, 1995).
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[The Defendant's conduct is a cause in fact of the injury if
it helped produce it and the injury would not have occurred without it]
OR
[The Defendant's conduct is a cause in fact of the
Plaintiffs injuries if it is a substantial factor in bringing
them about.]
The Defendant's conduct is [the] [a] proximate cause of the
Plaintiffs [injuries/damages] if it appears from the facts and
the circumstances surrounding the incident that an ordinarily
prudent person could have foreseen that injury or damage
would be the natural and probable consequence of the conduct.
However, the specific injury [or aggravation of a pre-existing
condition] that actually occurred need not have been foreseen.3

In the comment to this instruction, the Commission directs the
reader to case law to discern the appropriate instruction for
cause-in-fact.'
Currently, attorneys and judges struggle with the issues
raised by this Comment before choosing jury instructions. Ambiguities in the law of causation provide for a variety of possible
jury instructions, and the process of choosing the instructions is
often contentious. This process is further complicated by attorneys who naturally take advantage of these ambiguities by selecting instructions that will best serve the interests of their
clients.' Worst of all, the chosen instructions frequently confuse the jury. As previously noted, in Allers v. Riley38 the Mon-

MONTANA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIvIL) 2.06 (1991).
34. The Commission notes specifically direct the reader to Rudeck v. Wright,
218 Mont. 41, 709 P.2d 621 (1985) and Young v. Flathead County, 232 Mont. 274,
757 P.2d 772 (1988).
35. Some Montana attorneys, in fulfilling their duties of zealous representation,
may view the process of submitting jury instructions strategically. For example, defense attorneys may advocate the foreseeable result test for proximate cause, because
liability is definable, the outcome predictable, and an escape route calculable. Interview with Gary Graham, Member of the MPI Commission, Missoula, MT (July 18,
1995). On the other hand, plaintiffs attorneys may argue that the foreseeability test
in a jury instruction opens the door for a confused, misled jury. Telephone Interview
with L. Randall Bishop, Member of the MPI Commission, Billings, MT (June 28,
1995).
36. 273 Mont. 1, 901 P.2d 600 (1995).
33.
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tana Supreme Court awarded the defendant a new trial because
the bailiff met the jury's request for a legal dictionary in the jury
room. 7 The decision hinged on the fact that there was no mention of "foreseeability" in the dictionary definition of "proximate,"
and as a result, this jury misconduct substantially affected the
defendant's rights.3 8 Not only did the results of this case reiterate the inherent confusion of using foreseeability as a factor for
determining proximate cause, but they underscored the need for
understandable jury instructions.
Justice Trieweiler articulated these concerns in the dissenting opinion:
It occurs to me that the only prejudice that occurred in this
case, occurred when the District Court gave its instruction No.
14 which pertained to proximate cause and was mandated in
our decision in Kitchen Krafters .... That instruction is a

convoluted, incomprehensible and irrelevant description of an
abstract legal notion which did not belong in the jury instructions in the first place. To suggest that one of the parties was
prejudiced when the jury tried to overcome this considerable
judicially-created obstacle by trying to understand the relatively simple concept of causation through other means, carries the
detached, misguided and esoteric notions of Kitchen Krafters to
a new extreme."9
The frustration among attorneys, judges, and juries is primarily
due to the interplay among the elements of proximate cause,
cause-in-fact, and duty. Part IV of this Comment addresses this
problem by examining how a broad application of the "substantial factor" test would infringe upon a necessary proximate cause
analysis. Part IV also examines how the proximate cause analysis during the Kitchen Krafters era infringed upon a proper duty
analysis. Part VI examines how the Busta decision did not properly resolve these problems. While the present debate in Montana primarily focuses on proximate cause, clarification of this
element is only possible after an examination of the general
background of all three related elements: proximate cause, duty
and cause-in-fact.

37.
38.
39.

Allers, 273 Mont. at 9, 901 P.2d at 605.
Id. at 7, 901 P.2d at 604-05.
Id. at 12, 901 P.2d at 607 (Trieweiler, J., dissenting).
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III. GENERAL BACKGROUND OF THE APPLICABLE NEGLIGENCE
ELEMENTS

A defendant is liable for negligence after the plaintiff proves
four elements: duty, breach, cause, and damage.' Duty and
breach constitute negligence, but to recover, the plaintiff is required to prove a causal link between the defendant's negligence
and the damage. 4 ' Although causation is often referred to as an
element of negligence, it is helpful to think of it instead as a
requirement for negligence liability, rather than an element necessary to prove the negligence of the defendant. In this light, the
importance of a proper duty analysis becomes clear, for duty and
breach alone conclusively establish the defendant's negligence.
The purpose of the causation element is to find a "reasonable
connection" between the defendant's negligence and the
plaintiff's injury that justifies compensation for the plaintiff.42
Naturally, this nebulous standard subjects the causation element
to much debate about how to determine when a "reasonable
connection" exists.' Several considerations are important.
First, facts must somehow link the negligence to the damage." Frequently, this factual connection is referred to as
"cause-in-fact." Second, there must be a method for excluding
results too attenuated to reasonably justify compensation by the
defendant.' Causes-in-fact which are within these arbitrary,
policy-driven parameters of jurisprudence have often been called
the "proximate causes" of the plaintiffs damage.' This method
is supported by the reasoning that, while every proximate cause
is a cause-in-fact, not every cause-in-fact is a proximate cause.4 7
In this manner, the finding of "proximate cause" conclusively
establishes causation as a requirement for negligence liability.
Proper causation analysis limits liability to results reasonably
connected to the defendant's negligent conduct.' In essence, the

40.

KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 41, at 164-65.

41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id at 263.
Id. at 263-64.

44.

See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 41, at 263.

45. Id. at 264.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 165, 264.
48. This approach finds broad acceptance, although the order and form in which
these concepts appear varies among jurisdictions. See, e.g., Reiman Assoc. Inc. v. R/A
Advertising, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 292, 301 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that "legal
cause" is comprised of two elements, "proximate cause" and "cause-in-fact"); KEETON
ET AL., supra note 1, at 165 (explaining that "legal" or "proximate" cause is the ele-
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purpose of cause-in-fact is to make a scientific determination
based on facts, while the purpose of proximate cause is to make
an arbitrary determination based on policy. While the operation
of these fundamental purposes is helpful in defining the causation element of negligence, the difficulty lies in converting these
two tiers into workable rules of law. The specific problem is that
legal rules must be concrete and predictable; but unpredictability
is the very nature of a case with a complex chain of causation.
William Prosser articulated the riddle about the relationship
between the law and causation in noting that "[a] rule for the
unpredictable is itself a contradiction in terms."49
In summary, cause-in-fact, duty, and proximate cause play
important roles in the negligence equation. If properly applied,
these elements answer the question of whether a defendant had
a duty to a plaintiff, and if so, whether the defendant's conduct
was a factual and proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury, thereby justifying compensation. Although these elements are related,
it is necessary first to discuss them individually.
A. Cause-in-Fact
Cause-in-fact determines a factual connection between the
defendant's negligence and the plaintiffs injury. ° Usually this
is accomplished by inquiring whether and what damage would
have occurred without the defendant's negligence, in order to
eliminate the defendant's liability as to this damage."1 As stated
earlier, this method is commonly known as the "but for" test for
cause-in-fact; it decides that "but for" the defendant's conduct,
the injury would not have occurred. 2 However, there are times
when it is difficult to discern what would have happened to the
plaintiff in the defendant's absence.
This phenomenon may be explained by the classic hypothetical involving two property owners separated by dense forest.5 3
Suppose each property owner negligently drops a match, and a

ment, and comprised in it is the cause-in fact notion); Beauchene v. Synanon Found.
Inc., 151 Cal. Rptr. 796, 797 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that "cause-in-fact" (or the
"but for" test) and "proximate cause" are separate negligence elements).
49.
William L. Prosser, PalsgrafRevisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 28 (1953) [hereinafter PalgrafRevisited].
50. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 41, at 264-65.

51.
52.

See id, at 265.
See id.

53. The hypothetical discussed here was adapted from the facts and holding of
Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P & S. Ste. M. Ry. Co., 179 N.W. 45 (Minn. 1920).
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raging forest fire results. Either could successfully argue that
her conduct was not the cause-in-fact of the damage. Specifically,
both parties would fail the "but for" test because a fire of the
same caliber would probably have occurred regardless of their
respective negligence, whatever the respective degree may have
been. Because it is unjust to allow one party to escape liability at
the expense of her neighbor, the "substantial factor" test was
initiated as a favorable replacement for the "but for" test under
such circumstances.
The problem with the introduction of the "substantial factor"
test is that it calls the importance of the "but for" test into question. One might observe that the "but for" test seems superfluous
because if something is a "substantial factor" in causing an injury, then naturally the injury would not have occurred "but for"
this substantial factor. The general rule in Montana, however, is
that the "substantial factor" test is limited only to circumstances
when the "but for" test would not operate properly, due to a
situation similar to the forest fire hypothetical. 5' The "but for"
test has not been retired because it is a mathematically precise
therefore more effective than the imprecise word
test, and is 55
"substantial." Additionally, the word "substantial" can raise
improper inferences of "proximity."5"
B. Proximate Cause
A finding of proximate cause ensures that a factual connection is reasonable enough to justify compensation for the plaintiff.57 Proximate cause is a necessary test because there must be
a method for excluding damage too attenuated from the
defendant's act to reasonably justify compensation for this damage.58
Not unlike today, medieval scholars attempted to define
proximate cause.5 9 As an element of the negligence equation,

54. See, e.g., Kyriss v. State, 218 Mont. 162, 167, 707 P.2d 5, 8 (1985).
55. See Rudeck v. Wright, 218 Mont. 41, 53, 709 P.2d 621, 628 (1985) (concluding that the "but for" test works well in many cases).
56. The California Supreme Court has recognized that "substantial factor" infers
proximate cause, and has gone so far as to adopt the "substantial factor" test as a
complete replacement for a proximate cause analysis. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
57. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
58. KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 41, at 264.
59. Patrick J. Kelley, Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: History, Theory, and
the Present Darkness, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 49, 55 n.28 (1991) (noting that medieval
scholastic philosophy distinguished "proximate cause" as that cause which has the
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however, the notion of proximate cause arrived much later. At
first, courts were concerned with pinpointing a defendant's
wrongful conduct, rather than addressing the resulting effects of
the conduct.6 ° For example, one of the earliest theories of negligence incorporated a general duty of care. Originally, this meant
that everyone had a general duty of care to all parts of the custom under which he was operating.6 Duty was not limited to a
specific event or a specific person. 2
It became apparent, however, that the results of the
defendant's breach of a general duty could, like a row of falling
dominoes, extend indefinitely.63 For example, in Flower v. Adam, the defendant was responsible for dumping a pile of lime
rubbish in the street." The wind blew some of the debris, startling the plaintiffs horse and causing it to turn toward an oncoming carriage.65 The plaintiff violently tugged the reigns, and
the horse ran into another pile of rubbish, ultimately throwing
the plaintiff and injuring him.66 The court held that "Id]umping
debris in the road is a public nuisance because it obstructs travel, not because it gives rise to dust that may spook a horse. A
wind-whipped dust whirlwind could have spooked plaintiffs
horse if the lime rubbish heap had been by the side of the road,
and hence not a public nuisance."6" Essentially, the court used a
"but for" analysis to find that, while the defendant breached his
general duty to abstain from creating a nuisance, the result
could have occurred regardless of this breach. The court added
that the result was "too remote to affect the [d]efendant in this
action."" This analysis represents the early methods of protecting a defendant from remote liability.
While helping to set some limits, cause-in-fact was often an
inadequate limit for causal sequence cases." Plaintiffs with
freakish and isolated injuries could eventually find someone to
power or capacity to bring about the effect, while a "remote" cause was "merely a
necessary condition," in and of itself insufficient to establish a true cause).
60. See Kelley, supra note 59, at 61-64 (discussing the early emphasis on the
"reasonable man" standard of care, and pleading a general duty of care).
61.
Id. at 63-64.
62. Id.
63.
See PalsgrafRevisited, supra note 49, at 24.
64.
See Kelley, supra note 59 (citing Flower v. Adam, 127 Eng. Rep. 1098 (C.P.
1810)).
65. Id. at 65.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See PalsgrafRevisited, supra note 49, at 24.
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blame by tracing the sequential chain back as far as needed."
Because the "but for" test could be applied to ridiculously remote
actions or defendants, the quest began for a better limiting rule.
In response, two limiting theories formed under the rubric of
"proximate cause."71 The earliest method for limiting liability
through causation was the "direct cause" test.72 This method
examined the events between the defendant's wrongful act and
the plaintiffs injury and asked whether the events flowed in an
ordinary, natural and continuous sequence. 3 If they did, the
defendant's conduct was a proximate cause of these results, and
liability attached.
While there was general agreement that a proximate cause
rule was needed, the direct cause theorists were soon confronted
with a new theory.74 Frederick Pollock was famed for introducing the second limiting theory, "that the proximate cause limitation in negligence cases, precluded liability for harm a reasonable person in defendant's position would not have foreseen." 5
While many scholars continued to rely upon the original "direct
cause" test, Pollock's view marked the beginning of the rivalry
between the direct cause theory of proximate cause and the foreseeable result theory.76 The next section will examine how the
duty element also came to implement the notion of "foreseeability" as a limiting mechanism.
C. Duty
Like the theories of proximate cause, duty has to a varying
extent been employed as a means of limiting a defendant's liabil-

70. See id.
71.
See Kelley, supra note 59, at 73-74.
72.
Id. at 74.
73. Id. at 74-75 (citing FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE 73-74 (2d ed. 1878)).
74. Id. at 75.
75. Id. at 73, 80.
76. Compare Milwaukee & Saint Paul Ry. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 474
(1876) (applying the "direct cause" test) with Fairbanks v. Kerr, 70 Pa. 86 (1871)
(applying the "foreseeable consequences" test). For a brief, speculative discussion of
why judges began implementing the foreseeable consequences test, see Kelley, supra
note 59, at 76-77.
Similarly, Montana law has reflected fluctuation between these two tests. Montana previously employed the "direct cause" test according to MJIG 15.00, then employed the "foreseeable result" test prescribed in Kitchen Krafters v. Eastside Bank
of Montana, 242 Mont. 155, 159, 789 P.2d 567, 575 (1990). For a discussion of the
current law, see infra part VI.
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ity.71 Under the notion of "specific duty," courts attempted to
define a defendant's ultimate liability by specifically defining the
scope of his or her duty.7" The competition for "the limiting element," then, has fluctuated among (1) the proximate cause theory of direct cause, (2) the proximate cause theory of foreseeable
results and (3) the specific duty theory.
The use of duty as a limiting element grew out of a dissatisfaction with both theories of proximate cause.7 9 Joeseph
Bingham, a legal scholar from the early 20th century, provided a
widely accepted view of the relationship between proximate
cause and duty.80 He viewed any liability inquiry beyond a "butfor" analysis of cause-in-fact as a question of duty, not cause.8 '
In contrast with the earlier "general duty" of care theory,
Bingham believed that duty was a specific obligation, either
owed or not owed to the specific plaintiff, as defined by the court
after the facts of the case are before it. 8 Bingham's analysis
helped solve the domino-effect that could accompany a general
duty of care, but it also had the effect of reducing-if not eliminating-the importance of a proximate cause analysis. 3 This
phenomenon occurred because the same principles and words
used to define duty were also being used to define proximate
cause: foreseeability, directness, sequence, results, circumstances. Naturally, then, when one element focused on the "sequence,"
or the "foreseeable consequences," proof of the other element
with the same focus became redundant."
This teeter-tottering between duty and proximate cause is
best exemplified in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Compa-

77.
See generally Kelley, supra note 59, at 82-88.
Id. at 83-85.
78.
79.
Id. at 82.
80. Id.
81.
Id. (tracing Bingham's theories of duty and proximate cause according to
Joeseph Bingham, Some Suggestions Concerning "Legal Cause" at Common Law, 9
COLUM. L. REV. 16, 36 (1909)).
82.
Kelley, supra note 59, at 86.
83.
Bingham's theory required that the duty parameters be defined so precisely
that if damage were outside of these parameters, the defendant would potentially not
be responsible for even direct causes or foreseeable results. See id.
84. See William Prosser, Proximate Cause in California, 38 CAL. L. REV. 369,
395-96 (1950) (declaring that, although "[t]here is an appealing neatness and simplicity in the limitation which makes the same foreseeable risk that defines negligence
define the boundaries of liability for it," this simplicity is deceptive). It is deceptive
because, while it is relatively easy to limit the scope of a defendant's duty based on
his ability to foresee all possibilities of harm, it is very difficult to foresee the precise harm. Id. at 396.
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ny. Palsgraf involved some questionable conduct leading to
rather unpredictable results.8" Helen Palsgraf stood on a platform of the Long Island Railroad." When a train began to pull
away, two men ran to catch it.88 One of the men carried a package, and lost his balance a bit when he jumped on the train.89
In an effort to help him, one guard aboard the train reached
forward to pull him, and another guard on the platform pushed
him. This "assistance" knocked the package out of the
defendant's hands. 1 Although innocent-looking, the package
contained fireworks, which caused an explosion upon impact
with the ground.2 The shock from this explosion knocked loose
some scales at the end of the platform, which hit Helen Palsgraf
and injured her.93
In writing for the majority, Chief Justice Cardozo noted that
"[p]roof of negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do."94 The
court held that because there was no negligence specifically to
the plaintiff, the defendant was not liable.95 In this manner,
Cardozo followed the philosophy of Joeseph Bingham by setting
specific limits on the duty of the guards.9" In doing so, the court
also implemented another kind of foreseeability test; it reasoned
that because the defendant's actions created no foreseeable risk
to the specific plaintiff, there was no duty owed.9
Writing in dissent, Justice Andrews took a more general
view of duty, deciding there "is a duty imposed on each one of us
to protect society from unnecessary danger, not to protect A, B,
or C alone."98 Further, Andrews examined the cause, or results

85.
162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
86. Palsgrafs narrow split is worth noting because its fame is attributed to the
persuasive opinions of both the majority and the minority opinions. Seven of thirteen
judges voted to give the case to the jury. Verdict for the plaintiff was set aside by
four of the remaining six judges, who then dismissed the complaint and held for the
defendant. The Restatement of Torts adopted the majority rule only after vigorous
debate and a narrowly divided vote. See PalsgrafRevisited, supra note 49, at 1.
87. Palsgraf,162 N.E. at 99.

88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id.

91. Id.
92. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 99.
93. Id94. Id. (quoting FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS 425 (lth ed. 1916)).
95. Id. at 100.
96. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
97. Palsgraf Revisited, supra note 49, at 5. This test addresses the foreseeable
risks defining duty, rather than foreseeable results defining proximate cause.
98. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 99, 102 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
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of the defendant's conduct.9 9 He concluded that a defendant's
liability should be limited to "proximate results," defined as
follows:
What we do mean by the word "proximate" is that, because of
convenience, of public policy, or a rough sense of justice, the
law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a
certain point. This is not logic. It is practical politics.... The
words we used ... [are] simply indicative of our notions of pub-

lic policy. Other courts think differently. But somewhere they
reach the point where they cannot say the stream comes from
any one source."
Although Andrews does not use the usual "natural and continuous sequence" language in his opinion, the last sentence connotes
the "direct causation" approach for limiting defendant's liability.
Precisely how courts would implement this "rough sense of justice" equation is one of the many questions remaining after
Palsgraf,among the criticism of both the majority and the minority opinions." 1
William Prosser compared the foreseeable risk test for duty
and the direct cause test for proximate cause 0 2 by noting that
they both attempt to find a "reasonably close connection" between the acts of the defendant and the injury to the plaintiff.' In a related discussion, Prosser explained that the rationale for applying a proximate cause test is to eliminate those
results which are "too cockeyed and far-fetched."' Prosser's
observations suggest that even the most reputable theorists are
guided through the causation maze by simple principles of common sense.
IV. ANALYSIS OF MONTANA'S LAW OF CAUSATION DURING THE
KITCHEN KRAFTERS ERA

The frustration among Montana attorneys, judges, and juries
is primarily due to the interplay among cause-in-fact, proximate

99. Id.
100. Id. at 103-04.
101. See, e.g., Palsgraf Revisited, supra note 49, at 7 (finding it a mistake for
the court to omit further discussion of the duty owed to Helen Palsgraf because of
her status as a passenger).
102. One could also add the foreseeable result test for proximate cause to
Prosser's list.
103. See PaIsgrafRevisited, supra note 49, at 27.
104. Id. (quoting one of Prosser's freshman students, attempting to define the
limits of a defendant's liability).
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cause, and duty analyses. The first section of this part evaluates
the two-tiered approach to the causation element established in
the Kitchen Krafters decision. The second section discusses the
first tier, cause-in-fact, and considers the problems that attend a
broad application of the "substantial factor" test. The third section discusses the second tier, proximate cause, and examines
how the proximate cause analysis during the Kitchen Krafters
era infringed upon a proper duty analysis. This final section
discusses proximate cause and duty together because, during the
Kitchen Krafters era, the distinction between these two elements
was blurred.
A. The Two-Tiered Approach
Just as a contractor should insure that the frame of a building is secure before attending to the details within, it is necessary to inspect Montana's causation framework during the Kitchen Krafters era before specifically examining the elements that
influenced Montana's causation law. The Kitchen Krafters decision established a two-tiered approach to the causation element.0 5 This approach corresponded well with the fundamental purposes of the causation element. The first tier supplied a
cause-in-fact test to draw a connection between the defendant's
conduct and the plaintiffs injury. The second tier supplied a
proximate cause test to insure that the connection was reasonable enough to justify compensation. Because the factual connection is often broad in scope, possibly limitless, the proximate
cause tier properly required that a limiting line be drawn.
By realigning the law to comport with its fundamental purposes, the two-tiered analysis introduced in Kitchen Krafters
provided a secure framework for causation law in Montana. To
function effectively, however, the tests within the framework
needed to advance the purposes behind this approach, not impede them.
B. The First Tier: Cause-in-Fact
As indicated in the background discussion of cause-in-fact,
the first tier may be satisfied by one of two different tests: the

105. Kitchen Krafters v. Eastside Bank of Montana, 242 Mont. 155, 168, 789
P.2d 567, 574 (1990) (holding that whether the plaintiff proved cause-in-fact by either
the "substantial factor" test or the "but for" test, it then "becomes incumbent on him
to move to the second tier": proximate cause).
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"but for" test or the "substantial factor" test. Montana's largest
problem with the cause-in-fact tier has been how and under
what circumstances the "substantial factor" test replaces the "but
for" test. The Montana Supreme Court has repeatedly qualified
the "substantial factor" test as being a rare alternative for the
"but for" test."° Use of the test has been limited to situations
in which multiple defendants (or the contributing negligence or
condition of the plaintiff), by their similar relations to the event,
were each capable of causing the result individually or concurring with the others in bringing it about."°7 Under this notion,
occurrences involving the exclusive responsibility of only one
defendant would continue to be subjected to the "but for" test
because the "substantial factor" test is not needed to prevent
injustice.'
It is helpful to locate the boundaries around Montana's use
of the "substantial factor" test as they are set by case law. The
Montana Supreme Court instated the "substantial factor" test in
two landmark cases, Rudeck v. Wright 9 and Kyriss v.
State." In Rudeck, a doctor failed to detect a surgical sponge
that he left inside a patient, despite numerous visits."' Additionally, two assisting surgical nurses neglected to inform the
doctor of an unaccounted sponge, and a radiologist failed to inform the doctors that X-rays revealed the presence of the
sponge." The defendant doctor tried to argue that he was not
liable because the negligence of the nurse and the radiologist
was sufficient to cause the resulting injuries."' The court was
unpersuaded, and held that the actions of the nurses, the radiologist and the doctor were "concurrent causes," and that the
doctor was liable because his conduct was a "substantial factor"
in causing the damage."' Similarly, in Kyriss, a case discussed
earlier, the court held that the plaintiffs preexisting condition of
arteriosclerosis and the doctor's negligence in not detecting gangrene concurred in causing the patient's leg to be amputated at

106. See, e.g., Rudeck v. Wright, 218 Mont. 41, 53, 709 P.2d 621, 628-29 (1985).
107.
See, e.g., id.
108.
Nonetheless, some argue that the "substantial factor" test should enjoy a
broader application because it subsumes the "but for" test. See infra notes 120-26
and accompanying text.
109.
218 Mont. 41, 709 P.2d 621 (1985).

110.

218 Mont. 162, 707 P.2d 5 (1985).

111.
112.
113.
114.

Rudeck, 218 Mont. at 44, 709 P.2d at 623.
Id. at 44-45, 709 P.2d at 623.
Id. at 49, 709 P.2d at 627.
Id. at 53-54, 709 P.2d at 629.
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the knee."'
Rudeck and Kyriss illustrate the most common situation in
which the "substantial factor" test has been applied in Montana:
when concurring causes are present, or are likely to be present.
It is generally assumed that concurrent causes aid in bringing
about the damage; that is, even though the damage would have
occurred regardless of the other cause, it probably would have
been lesser in degree. For example, in Rudeck, the sponge would
either never have appeared, or it would have been detected sooner. Similarly, in Kyriss, although Mr. Templin was undoubtedly
facing an amputation, perhaps a greater portion would have
been saved but for one of the concurrent causes.
An important limitation to Montana's use of the "substantial
factor" test was established in Juedeman v. Montana Deaconess
Medical Center."' The court decided in Juedeman that, because
a patient must have died from either the negligent removal of a
catheter or the patient's preexisting condition, not a concurrence
of both, the "substantial factor" test would not apply." 7 The
court expressed that Kyriss mandated that the "substantial factor" instruction only be applied to causes that concurred in
bringing about the damage." 8 Because the situation in
Juedeman sharply contrasted with that of Kyriss, the court held
that the "but for" test should apply by default." 9 Specifically, in
Juedeman, either the preexisting condition or the nurse caused
the patient's death, but the concurrence of both was impossible.
In Kyriss, on the other hand, both the preexisting condition and
the doctor concurrently caused the extent of the amputation.
While the decision to apply the "but for" test in Juedeman
marks a clear limitation on the "substantial factor" test in Montana, other jurisdictions may have applied the "substantial factor" test to the facts in that case. These jurisdictions have adopted the notion of "substantial possibility" as a synonym for "substantial factor." 2 ' For example, evidence that expedient rescue
efforts would have saved the life of a suicide victim would warrant the use of the "substantial factor" test. 2 ' If this rationale
115. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
116.
223 Mont. 311, 726 P.2d 301 (1986).
117. Juedeman, 223 Mont. at 319, 726 P.2d at 306.
118.
Id. at 319, 726 P.2d at 305.
119. Id. at 319, 726 P.2d at 307.
120.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 41, at 41 (Supp. 1988).
121. Id. at 44-45 (citing Hake v. Manchester Township, 486 A.2d 836 (N.J.
1985); see also Waffen v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 799 F.2d
911 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that a cause of action exists if there was a "substantial
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were applied to the facts of Juedeman, the nurse's conduct and
the patient's preexisting condition could have been considered
"substantial factors," because they were mere "substantial possibilities" in causing the patient's death. 2 The Montana Supreme Court's holding in Juedeman, however, complies with the
proper standard of proof needed to evoke the "substantial factor"
test. To give credence to the probative nature of the name "substantial factor," the test is limited to conduct that is "more probably than not a contributing factor." 23
California's law of causation represents the broadest use of
the "substantial factor" test. In California, the "substantial factor" test, by itself, comprises the entire test for causation.'24 Although the Montana Supreme Court has recognized the propensity of the "substantial factor" test to subsume both the cause-infact and the proximate cause tiers, the court has denied this
effect.2 5 While the Montana Supreme Court has a tendency to
follow California's legal developments, its decision not to do so is
wise in this context. California's simple approach contradicts the
complexity of the causation element. The "substantial factor"
test, by itself, does not separate the factual determination that
"A" led to "D" from an evaluation of proximate cause; stated
differently, the substantial factor test does not, by itself, test the
reasonableness of the causal connection. Moreover, by implementing the "substantial factor" test as the sole determinant of
cause-in-fact, the precision of the "but for" test for pinpointing
the cause of most damages is forgotten.
In conclusion, the Montana Supreme Court should maintain
the current limitations on the "substantial factor" test prescribed
by case law. 2 ' This less precise test should be reserved for sit-

possibility" of survival, but not merely an "undefinable chance").
122. See id.
123. KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 41, at 43 (Supp. 1988).
124. See Mitchell v. Gonzales, 819 P.2d 872, 878-791 (Cal. 1991) (holding that
the proximate cause jury instruction should be abolished in favor of the "substantial
factor" test for "legal" cause).
125. See Juedeman, 223 Mont. at 321, 726 P.2d at 307 (reasoning that, had the
attorneys for the plaintiff been successful in retaining the "substantial factor" instruction in this case, it would have replaced the instructions for both cause-in-fact and
proximate cause); see also Kitchen Krafters v. Eastside Bank of Montana, 242 Mont.
155, 166, 789 P.2d 567, 574 (1990) (finding that the district court erred in allowing a
.substantial factor" jury instruction as a replacement for a proximate cause instruction).
126.
Specific limits are needed because the tactical uses of the "substantial factor" test by plaintiff's and defense attorneys may ultimately override the proper use
of the "substantial factor" test. Specifically, plaintiffs attorneys prefer a broad appli-
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uations in which one source of the damage cannot be pinpointed,
but there are concurring sources to varying degrees. Moreover,
whether the "but for" test or the "substantial factor" test is used
to satisfy the first tier, the Kitchen Krafters decision properly
mandated an analysis of proximate cause in the second tier of
the causation element.
C. The Second Tier: Proximate Cause and its Relationship with
the Duty Element
1. Montana's ForeseeabilityTests
Given the background discussion in Part III about duty and
proximate cause as competing limiting elements, Montana's two
main problems with using the foreseeability test for proximate
cause during the Kitchen Krafters era are clear. First, current
case law analyzes "foreseeability" within the "duty" element of
negligence.12 7 The parameters of a defendant's duty are defined
in terms of what risks were reasonably foreseeable. 28 While
this is slightly different from Kitchen Krafters's proximate cause
notion of finding foreseeable results of the defendant's negligence, the issue was whether it was redundant and confusing for
a jury to wrestle with foreseeability twice in a negligence analysis. Second, the Kitchen Krafters decision created concern about
whether the foreseeability test was the most effective test for
proximate cause.'29 The Kitchen Krafters foreseeability test excluded unforeseeable results within the direct causal chain,
which may otherwise be reasonably compensable.
Furthermore, since the Kitchen Krafters decision marked the
switch from a direct cause test to a foreseeable results test for

cation of the substantial factor test because it is a simpler, more easily applied jury
instruction. Additionally, the qualifying nature of the word "substantial" creates a
much greater inference of proximate cause than does the "but for" test. On the other
hand, defense attorneys may be able to argue that the defendant made such an
insubstantial contribution to the result that he or she should be absolved from liability. These observations were made after the following: Interview with Gary Graham, Member of the MPI Commission, Missoula, MT (July 18, 1995); Telephone
Interview with L. Randall Bishop, Member of the MPI Commission, Billings, MT
(June 28, 1995).
127. See infra notes 128-145 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., Mang v. Eliasson, 153 Mont. 431, 437-38, 458 P.2d 777, 781
(1969).
129. These issues were addressed by the court in Busta v. Columbus Hosp.
Corp., Mont. __, 916 P.2d 122 (1996); see infra notes 183-96 and accompanying
text.
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proximate cause,"'0 the relationship between the foreseeable
results test for proximate cause and the foreseeable risk test for
duty became increasingly muddled. The issues raised above must
be appropriately resolved for Montana courts and juries to apply
negligence law with clarity and predictability.
2. The Duty Test in Montana
Initially, it is important to note that prior to the Kitchen
Krafters decision, the Montana Supreme Court addressed the
role of duty as limiting element in Mang v. Eliasson."' No portion of Mang was overruled by Kitchen Krafters, and the case remains in effect as the authoritative method for ascertaining
duty. 132
In Mang, the defendant's weeds spread by wind to the
plaintiffs land, and the plaintiff sued for crop damage. 3 The
court found that "the evidence fail[ed] to substantiate ...

that

defendants' conduct created such a risk or hazard which was
unreasonably dangerous and hence negligent in the first instance.""u In holding that the defendant was not liable, the
court analyzed the element of duty as follows:
Foreseeability is of prime importance in establishing the element of duty and the question of defendant's negligence, if any,
must of necessity hinge on a finding of a breach of that duty. If
a reasonably prudent defendant can foresee neither any danger
of direct injury nor any risk for an intervening cause, he is
simply not negligent.'35
The Montana Supreme Court judged the defendant's "conduct in
light of the situation as it would have appeared to the reasonable
man in his shoes at the time of the act or omission complained
of."13 8 The court noted that the "plaintiff should not, by hind-

sight, be allowed to hold defendants to a higher degree of foreseeability than he himself had."'37 Finally, the court stated that
the issue "is not what might have prevented a particular accident, but what reasonably prudent men would have done in the

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See supra notes 7, 33 and accompanying text.
153 Mont. 431, 458 P.2d 777 (1969).
See, e.g., Belue v. State of Montana, 199 Mont. 451, 649 P.2d 752 (1982).
Mang, 153 Mont. at 433, 458 P.2d at 779.
Id. at 438, 458 P.2d at 781.
Id. at 437, 458 P.2d at 781 (emphasis added).
Id. at 437, 458 P.2d at 781.
Id. at 438, 458 P.2d at 781.
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discharge of their duties under the circumstances as they existed
at the time of the accident."13 This language from the Mang
indicates the emphasis the court placed on a "before the fact"
analysis of the duty element. That is, events that occurred after
the defendant's litigated act were excluded when determining the
defendant's duty.
While the foregoing language from Mang indicates that the
court followed a "general duty" theory, the court also engaged in
a "specific duty" discussion.'39 This added inquiry contravenes
the court's preference for a "before the fact" analysis of duty,
because a "specific duty" analysis necessarily asks what events
and which people were foreseeable, based on the benefit of a
"hindsight" look at the event.'
In essence, the holding and reasoning of the court in Mang
comports with a general duty analysis, thus making its discussion of specific duty unnecessary and improper. Two years after
Mang, the Montana Supreme Court attempted to clarify this
point in Ekwortzel v. Parker."" In Ekwortzel, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant's mule caused the horse upon which the
plaintiff was riding to fall, causing his injuries."' The defendant argued that, pursuant to Mang, he needed to be able to
foresee the specific accident to have a duty; in other words, duty
138. Mang, 153 Mont. at 435, 458 P.2d at 780.
139.
Id. at 436-38, 458 P.2d at 780-81 (quoting 2 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING
JAMES, JR., HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.2, at 1018 (1st ed. 1956),
which stated that, under the specific duty theory, the "obligation to refrain from
particular conduct is owed only to those who are foreseeably endangered by the conduct and only with respect to those risks and hazards whose likelihood made the
conduct unreasonably dangerous").
The Mang court also discussed the amount of care a defendant is required to
use in terms of the scope of the risk the defendant created by his conduct. Id. at
436-37, 458 P.2d at 780-81. This "scope of duty" notion can become problematic if the
scope of duty is defined using the chain of events after the fact to discern whether
the events were within the scope of the risk before the fact. Pointedly, this methodology usurps a proximate cause analysis, which should be the only element analyzing
the events after the defendant's litigated act. Thus, a scope of duty notion works
best if used in conjunction with the "reasonable person standard," and asks what
risks the reasonable person would have foreseen had that person engaged in the
same conduct as the defendant, before the defendant acted in such a manner that
litigation ensued.
140. For language in accord with this interpretation of Mang, see Rikstad v.
Holmberg, 456 P.2d 355 (Wash. 1969) (citing McLeod v. Grant Cty. School Dist. 255
P.2d 360 (Wash. 1953) (holding that "the pertinent inquiry is not whether the actual
harm was of a particular kind which was expectable. Rather, the question is whether
the actual harm fell within a general field of danger which should have been anticipated.")).
141.
156 Mont. 477, 482 P.2d 559 (1971).
142.
Ekwortzel, 156 Mont. at 479, 482 P.2d at 560.
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would be extended to the plaintiff only if the defendant could
foresee that someone's horse would slip and fall on a paved highway because of his mule." The court disagreed with the
defendant's interpretation of Mang, and instead cited Mang for
the proposition that duty is to be analyzed "at the time of the act
or omission complained of,"" rather than in light of what actually happened.'"
Regardless of this clarification in Ekwortzel, the supreme
court has continued to cite Mang for the contradictory notions of
general and specific duty. 1' This Comment suggests that Mang
be interpreted to embody the "before the fact" notion of general
7 This means that a
duty, as the court did in Ekwortzel."1

defendant's duty is defined by his ability to reasonably foresee
some kind danger at the time he acted; but not necessarily the
precise danger.'" The amount of care required, or the scope of
the defendant's duty, would similarly be analyzed before the
defendant acted. This interpretation is consistent with the Mang
court's reasoning."
This interpretation of the Mang is also preferable because it
does not prematurely invoke a proximate cause analysis. In
other words, the interpretation does not require the defendant to
foresee all the consequences of his actions. This interpretation of
Mang contrasts sharply with Palsgraf,where the majority followed Bingham's method by examining the events after the fact,
and in light of them, making an informed decision about whether
the defendant had a duty to the specific plaintiff.5 0 Bingham's
method requires an "after the fact" analysis by considering the
consequences and results of the defendant's conduct. In this
manner, Cardozo and others combined a cause and effect analysis within a duty analysis, thereby usurping any influence the
causation element had upon the equation. The Mang reasoning,
on the other hand, emphasizes that the question is whether the
defendant could have foreseen any risk or any danger of injury or

143.
144.
145.
146.
Robson,
of Inst.,
147.
148.
(holding
149.
150.

Id. at 483, 482 P.2d at 562.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Belue, 199 Mont. at 454-55, 649 P.2d at 753-54; see also Scott v.
182 Mont. 528, 538-39, 597 P.2d 1150, 1155-56 (1979); Schafer v. State Dep't
181 Mont. 102, 105-06, 592 P.2d 493, 495-96 (1979).
See supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
See Pretty on Top v. City of Hardin, 182 Mont. 311, 597 P.2d 58 (1979)
a defendant who could not foresee any danger at all, is not negligent).
See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
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intervening cause, at or before the time he performed the litigated act. Appropriately, it is a "before the fact" analysis, concerned
with the potential risks of injury that a reasonable person had
the duty to foresee.' 5 '
The reasoning in Mang is akin to Andrews' reasoning in the
5 ' Again, it does not rely on the defendant's
dissent of Palsgraf.'
ability to foresee the precise risk of harm, but rather on his ability to foresee any risk of harm.'5 3 This characteristic
appropriately shifts any questions of remote or unusual results
into the domain of causation.1
To summarize, the Mang foreseeable risk test for duty is
appropriate for three reasons: First, it extends the scope of duty
beyond specific plaintiffs and injuries. Second, it requires a factual determination that the defendant should have foreseen a
risk of injury. And third, it does not inappropriately usurp a
causation analysis of results. Moreover, the Mang test complies
with one of the earliest theories of negligence, that of a "reasonable person" standing in the defendant's shoes, whereas the
theories of Bingham and Cardozo did not. Bingham's and
Cardozo's "after the fact" analysis suggests a standard more akin
to a that of a "clairvoyant person," rather than a reasonable
person, a standard too limiting on the parameters of a person's
duty to foresee a risk of harm.

151.
In practice it may be difficult to divorce the results of a defendant's act
from a determination of whether she had a duty to foresee a risk. This problem can
generally be avoided by applying the notion of duty broadly, and shifting an analysis
of the specific results into proximate cause. This practice also avoids confusing the
jury with a redundant foreseeability analysis.
152. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. The Mang reasoning and
Andrews' reasoning would protect the law-abiding motorist who ran over an unexpected body in the roadway. See PalsgrafRevisited, supra note 49, at 27.
153. For example, this test would not have protected the defendant who, in hitting a pedestrian with his speeding car, hurled the pedestrian's body against the
plaintiff, who was standing safely behind a bus. Although the result created by the
flying body was entirely absurd and unforeseeable, there was a risk of some injury
created by the defendant's driving. The defendant should seek protection under the
limiting notion of proximate cause. See PalsgrafRevisited, supra note 49, at 10-11.
154. This methodology would appropriately place an analysis of intervening
causes into the domain of causation, as they are events that occurred after the fact.
But see Shafer, 181 Mont. at 106, 592 P.2d at 496 (analyzing intervening causes
within duty). See also Prosser, supra note 84, at 395-96. Prosser opposed the notion
that a defendant should be absolved from liability merely because results are remote,
and argued instead that liability depends upon whether the burden of the loss
should fall upon the negligent defendant or the unexpecting plaintiff. Moreover,
Prosser suggested that this issue turns on policy; the specific question is how to
distribute the damage to a group most able to pay.
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3. The Kitchen Krafters Test for Proximate Cause
Before addressing the impact that the Kitchen Krafters decision had on Montana law, it is important to note the circumstances under which the case was presented to the supreme
court in 1990. MJIG 15.00, the jury instruction that contained
the "direct cause" language, was superseded by the MPI Commission in 1989.1 5 Although MPI 2.07 and 2.08 were a product
of hard work by the Commission, the court was nonetheless
dealing with an unfamiliar invention. The proposed instructions
were vastly different from those previously existing in MJIG
15.00, and were less than one year old.
The facts of Kitchen Krafters are also worth mentioning
because, unlike the facts of Palsgraf and Flower, they are not
typically "cockeyed or far-fetched." Kitchen Krafters, Inc. sought
to purchase commercial property in Great Falls, and Eastside
Bank of Montana (the Bank) acted as an escrow agent on the
property." 6 Real Estate broker Robert Schnell assisted Kitchen
Krafters with the purchase, but also negotiated a separate transaction with the Bank.'57 The Bank loaned Schnell $30,000, secured by a trust indenture on the property. 55 The escrow
agreement (of which Kitchen Krafters was aware) specified that
payments made to the Bank would be applied to Schnell's underlying trust indenture and Schnell would be responsible for the
balance.'59 On July 9, 1973, Kitchen Krafters made a $5,000
payment; but rather than applying this sum to the trust indenture, the Bank paid Schnell directly, and Schnell never applied it
to his debt."6 Kitchen Krafters discovered the Bank's neglect of
the agreement in 1980 or 1981, when the Bank told Kitchen
Krafters that the property held in trust would not be released
until the balance was paid.' Kitchen Krafters claimed that, as
a direct result of the Bank not releasing the trust indenture, the
Kitchen Krafters corporation dissolved.6 2 The trial court
instructed the jury on "legal cause" using MPI 2.07 and 2.08."63

155. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
156. Kitchen Krafters v. Eastside Bank of Montana, 242 Mont. 155, 158, 789
P.2d 567, 569 (1990).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 159, 789 P.2d at 569.
161. Kitchen Krafters, 242 Mont. at 159, 789 P.2d at 569.
162. Id. at 160, 789 P.2d at 570.
163.
Note that "legal cause" is a synonym for "proximate cause." Id. at 168, 789
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The supreme court reversed and remanded, for failure to properly instruct on proximate cause. 16 In turn, the Montana Supreme Court directed the trial court to apply a foreseeable results test. Specifically, in order for the Bank's negligence to be
the proximate cause of the purchaser's injury, the facts and circumstances surrounding nondisclosure must indicate that the
Bank could have foreseen that the break up of the corporation
would be the natural and probable consequence of their acts."
Unlike the foreseeable results test for causation introduced
in Kitchen Krafters, the Mang foreseeable risk test for duty, as
interpreted by Ekwortzel, is much broader. As opposed to foreseeing specific consequences, the defendant must have been able to
foresee "neither any danger of direct injury nor any risk for an
intervening cause."" It follows that the Mang analysis satisfies the element of duty, and causation is still required to justify
compensation. By not attending to this existing analysis within
the duty element, the court in Kitchen Krafters produced a redundant and confusing analysis of foreseeability. By confusing
the role of foreseeability played in the negligence equation, the
court also confused attorneys, judges, and jurors." 7

V. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
A. Redelineation of Montana Law
The fundamental purpose of the causation element is to
limit liability to those cases where the connection between the
defendant's negligence and the plaintiffs injury is reasonable. In
clarifying the law of causation in Montana, this Comment proposes that Montana consistently apply a two-tiered approach to
comport with this fundamental purpose. The first tier would
supply a cause-in-fact test to find a connection, and the second

P.2d at 574.
164. Id. at 170, 789 P.2d at 576.
165. Id. at 169, 789 P.2d at 575.
166. See supra text accompanying note 135.
167. Two years after Kitchen Krafters, the Montana Supreme Court recognized
the redundance in requiring two foreseeability analyses in Sizemore v. Montana Power Co., 246 Mont. 37, 803 P.2d 629 (1990). In Sizemore, the court held that foreseeability belongs in the context of either duty or cause, but not both. Id. at 46, 803
P.2d at 635.
The court in Kitchen Krafters also overlooked the possibility of reinstating the
direct cause test for proximate cause. This analysis would require examining the
results of the defendant's act to determine whether they flowed in a natural, continuous sequence to produce the specific outcome.
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tier would supply a proximate cause test to insure that the connection is reasonable enough to justify compensation.
The first tier, cause-in-fact, would be satisfied by either the
"but for" test or the "substantial factor" test, whichever is appropriate. The "substantial factor" test would be appropriate only
when the following factors are present: (1) the "but for" test fails
due to the concurrence, or probable concurrence, of causes; and
(2) the defendant's conduct was more probably than not a substantial factor in bringing about the result. Additionally, the
"substantial factor test" only satisfies the first tier of the approach; a proximate cause test should always follow the use of
either the "substantial factor" test or the "but for" test.
In order to maintain the appropriate test for the second tier,
this Comment suggests that Mang's foreseeable risk test for duty
should be maintained as it was interpreted in Ekwortzel.'"
This would define a defendant's duty by his ability to reasonably
foresee some kind danger at the time he acted, but not necessarily the precise danger.
Given that foreseeability would be examined under duty,
this Comment proposes that Kitchen Krafter's foreseeable results
test for proximate cause be completely overruled. This change in
the law would eliminate a redundant application of the foreseeability concept and simplify causation jury instructions. As a
replacement, this Comment proposes that Montana assume a
direct cause test for proximate cause. This test would consider
whether the events between the defendant's negligence and the
plaintiffs damage were natural and continuous.
This revision of Montana law advances the fundamental
purposes of the causation element, and this organization clarifies
each part of the element. In particular, this revision solves
Montana's largest problem with causation by more effectively
separating duty from proximate cause. First, the tests can be
kept separate because they confront two very distinct situations.
Pointedly, duty is confined to a "before the fact" analysis of the
reasonably foreseeable risks-any risks-of a defendant's acts.
Proximate cause, on the other hand, examines the directness of
the results "after the fact." As a result, a duty analysis need not
be forced upon a case addressing uncanny results, and a proximate cause test will not incompetently dominate what is essentially a duty question. Second, these revisions embrace, rather
than fight, the "teeter-totter" dynamic inherent in the process of

168.

See supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
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balancing the limiting elements of duty and proximate cause.
Under these revisions, one limiting element is not regularly
preferred over the other, but may require more emphasis in
particular cases. Specifically, the facts of some cases will be
tailored to a duty analysis while others will involve causation
issues. Moreover, if a particular case presents issues of fact as to
both elements, the jury is less likely to be confused because the
definitions and applications for each are distinct.
B. ProposedJury Instructions
In response to the redelineation of the law of causation proposed in this Comment, the following jury instructions are proposed:
Cause
a. Cause-in-fact
i. The 'but for" test:
If you find that the damage to the plaintiff
would not have happened but for the breach
of duty by the defendant, then the
defendant's conduct is a cause-in-fact of the
plaintiffs damage.
ii. The substantialfactor test:
QUALIFICATION:

If (1) there is a concurrence, or probable
concurrence of causes, and (2) the
defendant's conduct is more probably than
not a substantial factor in bringing about
the result;
then:
only those actors or factors meeting the
above requirements may qualify for the
substantial factor test for cause-in-fact as
follows:
SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR JURY INSTRUCTION. The
(defendant's conduct/plaintiff's conduct/preexisting condition) is a cause-in-fact of
the plaintiffs damage if the conduct or condition
was a substantial factor in bringing it about.
APPORTIONMENT. Apportionment of damages to

the plaintiff shall reflect the degree by which
each actor or factor was a substantial factor:
(1) after a proximate cause analysis, and
(2) within the determination of damages.
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1996
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b. Proximate Cause
If you find that the sequence of events between the
defendant's conduct and the damage to the plaintiff
was natural and continuous then the defendant's
conduct was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs damage.
VI. ANALYSIS OF BUSTA V. COLUMBUS HOSPITAL CORPORATION
In the most recent Montana case involving proximate cause,
Busta v. Columbus Hospital Corp.,"' the Montana Supreme
Court addressed "the role of foreseeability and the appropriate
manner for instructing juries on the issue of causation."7 ' With
the Busta decision, the court had an opportunity to rectify the
problems in causation law identified in foregoing sections of this
Comment. However, the Busta decision not only failed to fully
rectify those problems, but created additional sources of confusion. A careful reading of Busta reveals that the foreseeability
concept will continue to be applied as a method of finding proximate cause in many cases. In the remaining cases, not only is
the foreseeability test removed from the causation element, but
the proximate cause element is removed altogether. These peculiar results may be attributed to the fact that the court made two
improper assumptions. First, the court treated the foreseeability
concept as a necessary component of proximate cause. Second,
the court deemed that only cases involving third-party, intervening cause issues require a proximate cause analysis. Moreover,
interpreting the meaning of Busta creates confusion in and of
itself, for neither the court's reasoning nor the court's cited authorities support the court's limited overruling of Kitchen
Krafters. Further, the court left conflicting and confusing guidelines regarding the scope of the duty element, the use of the
substantial factor test, and the issue of when a proximate cause
instruction is warranted. This part concludes that the solution
proposed in Part IV of this Comment would be preferable to the
changes created by the Busta decision.
The facts of Busta reveal that Delbert Busta was admitted to
Columbus Hospital for surgical treatment of prostate cancer and
inguinal hernia repair.' Although he had been diagnosed with
simple schizophrenia when he was discharged from the Army,

169.
170.
171.

Mont. __, 916 P.2d 122 (1996).
Busta, __ Mont. at -,
916 P.2d at 133.
Id. at -,
916 P.2d at 125.
__
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Busta displayed no outward signs of mental or emotional problems when he was admitted.'72 During the early morning hours
following a successful surgery, Busta freed himself from his
catheter and I.V.s, constructed a makeshift rope out of two
sheets and a hospital gown, and attempted to escape through the
three foot by four foot opening in his third floor window.'73 Later that day, Delbert Busta died from injuries caused by his
fall.1 7 4 The attending nurse testified that, on the evening before
his death, Busta exhibited uncooperative behavior, refusing to
take his medication and be repositioned."' Also, his pulse was
abnormally rapid and his blood pressure was elevated.' 76 The
nurse did not report Busta's symptoms or unusual attitude to the
treating physician."' Other testimony revealed that less than
six months before Busta's death, an inspection team specifically
instructed the president of Columbus hospital "to restrict the
opening of your patient room windows, so that patients cannot
inadvertently fall or jump from the windows."'78 Two architects
testified that the window was unsafe, and the risk of a patient's
escape through such a window was foreseeable.'7 9
The district court rejected the defendant's proposed instructions on proximate cause, and the plaintiff withdrew its instructions once the defendant objected to them.8 ° The court did not
offer an instruction of its own, and as a result, the jury returned
a verdict in favor of the plaintiff after not receiving a proximate
cause instruction. 8 ' The district court attributed its failure to
instruct on proximate cause to the difficulty district courts face
when selecting proximate cause jury instructions due to the
Kitchen Krafters decision.'8 2 Accordingly, the district court requested that the requirements for causation jury instructions be
clarified by the Montana Supreme Court.
The Montana Supreme Court held that the district court did
not err in failing to provide a proximate cause instruction."8i
172. Id. Trial testimony indicated the diagnosis of "simple schizophrenia" was
ascribed to withdrawn, anti-social behavior, not bizarre or delusional behavior. Also,
Busta's wife and children did not know of this diagnosis. Id.
173. Id
174. Busta, __ Mont. at __, 916 P.2d at 125.
175. Id.
176. Id. at -,
916 P.2d at 125-26.
177. Id. at -,
916 P.2d at 126.
178. Id. at _,
916 P.2d at 127.
179. Busta, __ Mont. at __, 916 P.2d at 127-28.
180. Id. at __, 916 P.2d at 131.
181. Id. at -,
916 P.2d at 131-32.
182. Id. at __, 916 P.2d at 132.
183. Id. at -,
916 P.2d at 141. The court also found it was harmless error not
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Most importantly, the court responded to the district court's
request for clarification of the causation element by examining
Montana law before and after the Kitchen Krafters decision, and
by searching for methods of improving instructions."8 ' The
court found that "[t]he first time that the word 'foreseeable' ever
appeared in the context of 'proximate cause' in one of our opinions, other than as related to intervening causes," 185 was in the
Kitchen Krafters decision. The court then criticized its opinion in
Kitchen Krafters because the decision mandated a "redundant"
consideration of the foreseeability notion: Mang required that
foreseeability be established in duty and Kitchen Krafters required that foreseeability be established in causation."
In response to its examination of Montana's law of causation, the court partially overruled Kitchen Krafters in the following manner: "We therefore reverse that part of our decision in
Kitchen Krafters, which requires a two-tiered analysis of causation which includes consideration of foreseeability in cases other
than those where there has been an allegation that the chain of
causation
has been severed by an independent intervening
87
cause."
The court then gave four reasons which "compel" this holding. First, the requirement that the defendant need to have foreseen the plaintiffs injury requires proof of an intentional act,
rather than a negligent act. Second, the foreseeability analysis in
the proximate cause element is redundant because it is already
required in the duty element. Third, Montana statutes require
that foreseeability be considered in determining negligence, not
proximate cause. Fourth, the terms "foreseeability" and "proximate cause" are confusing and distracting to jurors."
Finally, the court set forth two proposed jury instructions:

to instruct the jury on the meaning of cause-in-fact. Id.
184. The court discussed the holdings in many of the cases analyzed in this
Comment, including: Sizemore v. Montana Power Co., 246 Mont. 37, 803 P.2d 629
(1990); Kitchen Krafters v. Eastside Bank of Montana, 242 Mont. 155, 789 P.2d 567
(1990); Young v. Flathead County., 232 Mont. 274, 757 P.2d 772 (1988); Rudeck v.
Wright, 218 Mont. 41, 709 P.2d 621 (1985); Kyriss v. State, 218 Mont. 162, 707 P.2d
5 (1985); Ekwortzel v. Parker, 156 Mont. 477, 482 P.2d 559 (1971); Mang v.
Eliasson, 153 Mont. 431, 458 B2d 777 (1969); Palsgraf v. Long Island Ry. Co., 162

N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
185.
186.
text.
187.
188.

Busta, Id. at __,

Mont. at -, 916 P.2d at 135.
916 P.2d at 136; see also supra notes 127-29 and accompanying

Busta,
Id.

Mont. at

-

__,

916 P.2d at 139.
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We hold that with the exception of those cases involving
allegations of independent intervening cause or multiple causes, it is sufficient to instruct the jury, as recommended in 1989
by the Montana Supreme Court Commission on Civil Jury
Instructions, that "The defendant's conduct is a cause of (injury/deatl/damage) if it helped produce it and if the (injury/death/damage) would not have occurred without it."
In those cases where the chain of causation is an issue
(e.g., where there is an allegation of an independent intervening cause), we recommend, as did the Commission in 1989, the
following instruction: "The defendant's conduct is a cause of the
(injury/death/damage) if, in a natural and continuous sequence,
it helped produce it and if the (injury/death/damage) would not
have occurred without it." 1 9

A. Interpreting the Busta Decision
1. A Limited Overrulingof Kitchen Krafters
At first glance, the Busta decision may appear to impose
substantial changes in the law of causation. This is so because
the majority argued strenuously against the court's former, "redundant" application of the foreseeability test, which resulted
from Kitchen Krafters. However, the decision actually imposed
only a very limited overruling of Kitchen Krafters. The court
pointedly reversed only "that part of our decision in Kitchen
Krafters which requires a two-tiered analysis of causation which
includes consideration of foreseeability in cases other than those
where there has been an allegation that the chain of causation
has been severed by an independent intervening cause. " " It
follows from this holding that the Kitchen Krafters foreseeability
analysis will still apply to those cases which contain appropriate
allegations of intervening causes. The court's "reversal" of Kitchen Krafters simply means that it will remove a redundant analysis of foreseeability from only one category of cases. 9 ' As a result, the Busta decision, though replete with criticism of the
foreseeability concept within proximate cause, will still permit a
redundant analysis of foreseeability in many negligence cases.

189. Id. (citations omitted).
190. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
191. See infra note 218 and accompanying text (explaining that in those cases in
which the foreseeability test is removed from the causation element, the proximate
cause element is removed altogether).
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Although this limited overruling may seem surprising and
impossible, given the court's extensive criticism of redundant
foreseeability tests, other parts of the decision support this interpretation. For example, the minority opinion in Busta interprets
the decision in precisely the same way, stating that "the majority
concludes it is unnecessary to address foreseeability as part of
the causation element, except in cases of intervening superseding
events." 9' Additionally, analysis of the majority's treatment of
precedent case law supports the fact that the court intended
such a limited overruling. In its analysis of prior decisions, the
court distinguished cases that involved intervening causes from
those that did not, and then qualified its overruling of Kitchen
Krafters according to this distinction. Specifically, the court stated that, before Kitchen Krafters, the court originally applied the
proximate cause test only in cases involving intervening causes.'93 Then the court noted that the first time foreseeability
entered discussions of proximate cause for non-intervening cause
cases was in Kitchen Krafters."' Finally, the court noted that
all cases applying the concept of foreseeability after Kitchen
Krafters, except Logan v. Yellowstone County,'95 involved intervening cause issues.'96 While this method of categorization is
criticized in Section B, it is clear from the court's categorization
of prior case law that it fully intended to limit the overruling of
Kitchen Krafters as the language of the holding indicates.
2. InterpretationProblems
Despite evidence of the Montana Supreme Court's intent to
create a change in the law, the reasons for the particular holding
in Busta are unclear. One problem arises because the court's
reasoning contradicts its holding. Curiously, the court's limited
overruling of Kitchen Krafters indicates that the court was operating under the notion that it is only redundant and inappropriate to use foreseeability in a proximate cause analysis in cases
that do not involve intervening causes. Problematically, this
notion is not supported by the court's four stated reasons for its

192. Busta, _ Mont. at _, 916 P.2d at 144 (Erdmann, J., concurring and dissenting) (emphasis added).
193. Id. at __, 916 P.2d at 133-35.
194. Id. at -,
916 P.2d at 135 (explaining that in Kitchen Krafters, the court
affirmed the two-tiered approach and mandated that foreseeability was to be applied
in all considerations of proximate cause).
195.
263 Mont. 218, 868 P.2d 565 (1993).
196. Busta, _ Mont. at _, 916 P.2d at 136.
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limited overruling of Kitchen Krafters. For example, the court's
second reason states that a foreseeability analysis in the causation element is redundant because it is already required in the
duty element. As well, the court's third reason explains that
Montana statutes require that foreseeability be considered in
determining negligence, but not proximate cause.'97 These stated reasons are unqualified and sweeping. Nowhere in the Busta
opinion does the court qualify these reasons or rationalize why
the concept of foreseeability is redundant in some cases but not
in others. Moreover, many of the authorities cited by the court do
not support the court's limited overruling of Kitchen Krafters;
rather, the authorities indicate that foreseeability is never an
appropriate concept in proximate cause. For example, the court
cites with approval the view that "[f]oreseeability does not touch
on the causal element. Foreseeability relates only to the element
of fault." 198 Unfortunately, the court failed to reconcile the differences between its holding and the assertions of its citations.
Another source of confusion concerns the jury instructions
proposed in Busta. Primarily, by proposing single instructions for
both categories of cases, 99 Busta impliedly overruled the Kitchen Krafters two-tiered approach to causation instructions. Accordingly, despite the language of the Busta holding, practitioners should be aware that after Busta, it appears that juries will
no longer be given a two-tiered causation test.

197. See id at __, 916 P.2d at 139.
198. Id. at -,
916 P.2d at 136 (quoting 1 J.D. LEE & BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW § 5.02 (rev. ed. 1990)). The court in Busta observed that "[a]lthough
we acknowledge that there are other jurisdictions which engage in such a dual analysis ...
knowledgeable writers and the better-reasoned decisions of other jurisdictions criticize such a redundant consideration of foreseeability." Id. (citations omitted).
The court also observed that "[t]he element of cause becomes operative only if a duty
is breached and damages result, whereupon the defendant becomes liable for the
damages directly caused by his breach of duty." Id. (citing Leon Green, The Causal
Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REV. 543, 549 (1962)).
The Busta court furnished additional authoritative quotations standing for the
same proposition. The court first quoted the Wisconsin Supreme Court as follows:
'his court is definitely committed to the principle that, while foreseeability is an
element to be considered by the jury in determining negligence, it has no part in the
jury's decision of whether particular negligence found by it is causal." Busta, __
Mont. at __, 916 P.2d at 136 (quoting Strahlendorf v. Walgreen Co., 114 N.W.2d
823 (Wis. 1962)). The court then quoted an article in the Michigan Law Review:
"Clearly the issue of causal relation between the defendant's conduct and the
plaintiffs injury is not determined by foreseeability .... Causal relation is a neutral
issue, blind to right and wrong." Id. (quoting Leon Green, The Causal Relation Issue
in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REV. 543, 549 (1962)).
199.
See supra text accompanying note 189 (explaining that one category of cases
involves intervening cause issues and the other category does not).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1996

35

554

Montana Law Review, Vol. 57 [1996], Iss. 2, Art. 12

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

Additionally, the substance of the jury instructions proposed
in Busta appears to contradict the court's limited overruling of
Kitchen Krafters. This confusion arises because in cases involving
intervening causes, the court eliminated the word "foreseeability"
from the causation instruction."0 The new instruction for causation in cases involving intervening cause issues asks whether
the results of the defendant's actions were "natural and continuous"; juries will no longer be asked whether particular results
were foreseeable. 1 Thus, on its face, this instruction appears
to drastically alter the analysis of proximate causation by reverting to a direct cause analysis similar to MJIG 15.00.02 As discussed earlier, however, the Busta opinion supports the continued use of the foreseeability concept in cases with intervening
causes at issue. The court removed the word "foreseeability" from
the instruction only because the word itself was confusing.2"
Thus, the instruction proposed in Busta, which does not incorporate the word "foreseeable," appears to contradict the limited
overruling of Kitchen Krafters, which allows a foreseeability
analysis in many cases. The effect of this contradiction is that
practitioners will still be able to argue the foreseeability concept
to juries, but they will not be able to offer the term in causation
jury instructions.
In summary, the court in Busta overruled Kitchen Krafters
in a limited way. The foreseeability concept will still apply to
cases with issues of intervening causes, regardless of the fact
that the word "foreseeability" has been removed from the jury
instruction. The other changes created by the Busta decision
involved the removal of the two-tiered causation instruction and
the removal of the proximate cause test altogether for cases
which do not involve intervening cause issues. The following
section provides analysis of these effects.
B. Analysis of the Busta Opinion
The following sections will analyze the Busta opinion in
terms of the two primary assertions used by the Montana Supreme Court in its decision of that case. First, the court's equat-

200. Busta, __ Mont. at __, 916 P.2d at 139.
201. Id.
202. Id.; see also supra note 7 and accompanying text.
203. Busta, __ Mont. at _, 916 P.2d at 140 (recommending that terms such as
"reasonable foreseeability" should "not be allowed to confuse jurors by the inclusion of

those terms in jury instructions").
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ing of foreseeability with proximate cause will be addressed.
Second, criticism will be made of the court's assumption that
only cases involving intervening causes require the proximate
cause test.
1. Foreseeabilityand Proximate Cause
As stated, the court in Busta decided that while the "natural
and continuous" language will appear in all causation jury instructions, the foreseeability concept will also apply to cases
involving intervening cause issues. Based upon these mandates,
it is apparent that the court finds that the concept of "foreseeability" and the concept of "natural and continuous" impart the
same meaning. In turn, it is apparent that the court is unable to
divorce the concept of foreseeability from the element of proximate cause.
By equating the terms in this way, the court failed to observe that there are many factors that may contribute to a proximate cause analysis. Interestingly, the Montana Supreme Court
cited to these many factors when it referenced Justice Andrews'
opinion in the Palsgraf case. As Justice Andrews suggested,
when analyzing proximate cause,
the court must ask itself whether there was a natural and
continuous sequence between cause and effect. Was the one a
substantial factor in producing the other? Was there a direct
connection between them, without too many intervening causes? Is the effect of cause on result not too attenuated? Is the
cause likely, in the usual judgment of mankind, to produce the
result? Or, by the2 4exercise of prudence foresight, could the
result be foreseen?
As indicated by Andrews' list of factors, foreseeability is but one
of the many ways to analyze proximate cause. Further, Andrews'
list indicates, by its inclusion of the word "or" preceding the word
foreseeability, that proximate cause can be interpreted with or
without a discussion of the foreseeability concept.
By failing to recognize the multiplicity of factors that can
attend proximate cause analyses, the court in Busta also failed
to recognize that there are two generally accepted methods for
determining proximate cause. First, under the "foreseeable results" theory of proximate cause, as discussed in earlier sections

204. Id. at __, 916 P.2d at 133 (quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island Ry. Co., 162
N.E. 99, 104 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting)).
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of this Comment, the jury is asked whether the defendant could
have reasonably foreseen certain results as a method for determining proximate cause." The other method for determining
proximate cause is the direct cause theory."' This asks the jury to look at the events between the defendant's act and the
plaintiffs injury and to determine whether they occurred in a
natural and continuous sequence. As stated, the jury instructions
proposed in Busta incorporate the wording of the direct cause
method. However, the court has affirmed the continued application of the foreseeability concept. In this way, the Busta decision
has created a mix of the two accepted methods for determining
proximate cause.
This Comment proposes that the concept of foreseeability
can be divorced from proximate cause analysis. In recognition of
the fact that the court finds the word "foreseeability" confusing
to jurors, this Comment further proposes that only one method of
determining proximate cause-the direct cause theory-should
be applied henceforth. The direct cause theory of proximate
cause is preferable because (1) it does not emphasize the ability
of the defendant to foresee all the consequences of his act, as
determined by the jury after the fact; and (2) the defendant's
ability to foresee risks is appropriately left to a duty analysis.20 7 Adoption of the direct cause method for determining
proximate cause would allow for a complete overruling of the
Kitchen Krafters decision, and would take both the word and the
concept of foreseeability out of causation analysis.
2. The Court's Categorizationof Negligence Cases
Section A argued that a complete overruling of Kitchen
Krafters could have been accomplished had the court adopted
only the direct cause test instead of a mixed test for proximate
cause. This section will further conclude that the direct cause
test also works well regardless of whether a case is categorized
as one involving intervening causes.
As noted earlier, after looking back at Montana negligence
cases extending over the past ten years, the court found that
most cases that used a proximate cause analysis were cases
involving intervening cause issues. The court explained that
cases before Kitchen Krafters "discuss[ed] proximate cause only
205.
206.
207.

See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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as it relates to continuing liability following an intervening
act."2" The court then cited several cases using a proximate
cause analysis since Kitchen Krafters, and explained that "all of
these cases, other than Logan, involved issues regarding the
foreseeability of intervening causes."2" Based on this data, the
court concluded that cases involving intervening cause issues are
the only cases that require a proximate cause instruction.210
This conclusion, based upon categorization, is troubling for three
reasons. First, it is misleading for the court to insert analysis
into prior cases which was not used at the time those decisions
were made. Second, the conclusion creates a confusing rule regarding when proximate cause instructions will be given. And
third, intervening cause cases are not the only negligence cases
that require a proximate cause analysis.
a. The Court's Categorizationis Misleading
The court's analysis of prior case law in Busta is misleading
because the court inserted a new method of reasoning which was
not used at the time those prior decisions were made. That is,
the court used after-the-fact analysis of selected cases to form a
rule for categorizing and applying causation law today. In doing
so, the court misconstrued the reasoning in cases both before and
after the Kitchen Krafters decision.
In Busta, the court asserted that "[i]n fact, our earlier decisions discuss ... proximate cause only as it relates to continued
liability following an intervening act."211 As an example, the
court cited Young, and stated that "Young was clearly an intervening cause case."212 This reasoning is misleading because
early cases, like Young, did not instruct on proximate cause
merely because there were intervening causes at issue. Rather,
instructions for the element were given because "[p]roximate
cause is an element of the cause of action for negligence, and
must be proven in order for a plaintiff to recover damages."21 3
In following this requirement, the court in Young implemented
the proximate cause test which was in effect at the time: "proxi-

208. Busta, - Mont. at -,
916 P.2d at 135.
209. Id. at -, 916 P.2d at 136.
210. Id. at -,
916 P.2d at 139.
211. Id. at -,
916 P.2d at 135.
212. Id.
213. Thelen v. City of Billings, 238 Mont. 82, 85, 776 P.2d 520, 522 (1989) (citing Young v. Flathead County., 232 Mont. 274, 282, 757 P.2d 772, 777 (1988)).
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mate cause is one which in a natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any new, independent cause, produces injury, and
without which the injury would not have occurred." 14
The court in Busta similarly misconstrued cases decided
subsequent to Kitchen Krafters. For example, the court in Busta
stated that: "[s]ince Sizemore involved allegations of a superseding, intervening event, we analyzed foreseeability as part of
proximate cause in that case."215 This statement by the court is
misleading because, again, it suggests that the court categorized
the case as an intervening cause case as a prerequisite to applying the proximate cause instruction. To the contrary, every case
cited by the court in Busta, including Sizemore, was decided
using established precedent which mandated an analysis of proximate cause as a limiting element." 6 For example, the court in
Sizemore stated:
The doctrine of proximate cause has been developed in an effort
to prevent unlimited liability ...

[i]n recognition of this fact,

the courts have sought to devise a means to cut off a
defendant's liability when principles of equity and common
sense demand such a result. By far the most common method
for achieving this end is through resort to the foreseeability
analysis." 7
Thus, like every other negligence case decided by the Montana
Supreme Court, the court in Sizemore did not implement the
proximate cause test because there were intervening causes, but
because it followed established precedent explaining that proximate cause was a necessary element. Further, like every other
negligence case decided by the court subsequent to Kitchen
Krafters, the court in Sizemore implemented the "foreseeability"
test because it was the required test at the time. As argued in
the preceding section, however, the foreseeability test could be

214. Young, 232 Mont. at 282, 757 P.2d at 777 (citations omitted). Note that this
test did not use the word "intervening," but instead emphasized the chain of causation.
215.

Busta,

-

Mont. at

-,

916 P.2d at 136.

216. See, e.g., Sizemore v. Montana Power Co., 246 Mont. 37, 43, 803 P.2d 629,
635 (1990) (citing Dvorak v. Matador Service Inc., 223 Mont. 98, 727 P.2d 1306
(1986), a case where the court affirmed summary judgment because the plaintiff
could not establish proximate cause as a necessary element of the negligence cause
of action).
217. Sizemore, 246 Mont. at 46, 803 P.2d at 635. The court supported this notion by accurately citing the methods used by several other Montana cases and explaining: "[in each of these cases we have set forth the rule that proximate cause
has its basis in foreseeability." Id. at 43, 803 P.2d at 633.
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removed from proximate cause analysis altogether and the proximate cause test would still have the same purpose and effect: the
prevention of unlimited liability.
b. The Court's Categorizationis Confusing
After holding that only cases involving intervening causes
require a proximate cause instruction, the court offered an instruction which states that an allegation of intervening cause is
necessary before a proximate cause instruction may be given.2 18
Accordingly, attorneys and judges will need to categorize future
cases in order to determine which deserve a proximate cause
instruction. However, the court's guidelines for making such a
categorization are unclear in the wake of the Busta decision. The
court held that, to make a valid assertion of intervening cause,
there must be proof offered at trial that indicates a third person's
contribution to the damage or injury of the plaintiff.2 19 Thus,
the court in Busta appears to limit proximate cause instructions
to situations in which a third party's act has intervened. This
reasoning is troubling because intervening causes have never
been qualified this way in Montana.
Causes that interrupt the causal chain may not necessarily
be third party acts. For example, in Young v. Flathead County,220 the County told condominium developers (developers) that
their development was not a subdivision, and would therefore
not be subject to review.2 2' Allegedly relying on this representation, the developers proceeded with the large financial project. 2 In finding it error for the district court to not allow evidence of other factors contributing to the developers' financial
damage, the Montana Supreme Court held that the "developers
218. The court stated that "[iun those cases which do not involve issues of intervening cause, proof of causation is satisfied by proof that a party's conduct was a
cause-in-fact of the damage alleged." Busta, Mont. at __, 916 P.2d at 139. See
supra text accompanying note 189 for the proximate cause instruction for the category of cases involving intervening causes.
219. Busta, Mont. at __ 916 P.2d at 140 (holding that there was "no proof
offered at the time of trial that any person contributed as a cause of Delbert's injury
and death other than Delbert and the defendant hospital"). Further, the error not to
instruct on proximate cause was harmless in part because "there was no evidence of
intervening acts by third parties which would interrupt the chain of causation." Id.
at -,
916 P.2d at 132. And finally, the court found that foreseeability discussions
in early cases were limited to those "situations where it was alleged that acts of
independent third parties intervened[.]" Id. at _,
916 P.2d at 133.
220.
232 Mont. 274, 757 P.2d 772 (1988).
221.
Young, 232 Mont. at 281, 757 P.2d at 776.
Id. at 281, 757
P.2d at 777-78.
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had to prove an uninterrupted chain of events ... [which] could

not be broken by any new, independent cause, such as economic
factors or failure to secure sanitary approval."223 In deciding
Young, the Montana Supreme Court neither relied on the notion
of "third party intervention" nor mentioned any form of the word
"intervene."224 Rather, the court appropriately considered all
possible interruptions to the causal chain-whether by actor,
event, or factor-to determine whether the injury flowed in a
natural and continuous sequence.225 The Montana Supreme
Court has applied this same method of analyzing intervening
causes in other cases.226 In some cases, the factors did not raise
sufficient issue of material fact to preclude summary judgment,227 but the factors themselves were certainly not considered inherently deficient because they did not specifically involve
third party intervention.
The burden the Busta decision places on attorneys and judges to define what is or is not an intervening cause is confusing.
Attorneys will be forced to decide how to categorize cases in the
face of conflicting guidelines-the guidelines offered in Busta
versus the guidelines offered in prior case law. Moreover, the
burden created by Busta is unnecessary. The proximate cause
element can be used in all cases, as argued in the following section, and the test should properly focus on the nature and degree
of the causal connection, not on the issue of whether a cause can
be defined as an intervening act by a third party.228
c. Proximate Causation is a Necessary Analysis in all Negligence
Cases
After Busta, only a cause-in-fact causation instruction will

223. Id. at 283, 757 P.2d at 777. The court also included the factor of failure to
secure financial approval. Id.
224. Interestingly, the court in Busta categorized Young as "clearly" an intervening cause case. Busta, __ Mont. at _,
916 P.2d at 135.
225. Young, 232 Mont. at 283, 757 P.2d at 777-78.
226. See, e.g., Thayer v. Hicks, 243 Mont. 138, 154, 793 P.2d 784, 794 (1990)
(considering the following factors in the chain of causation: loss of employees, competition from another business, lack of a market and leveraged condition); Thelen v.
City of Billings, 238 Mont. 82, 88-89, 776 P.2d 520, 524 (1989) (holding that climate,
storms, crop irrigation and water table fluctuation could address the issue of proximate cause, and help determine whether "the 'sequence' between the Defendant's actions and the Plaintiffs' injury was 'unbroken by any new, independent cause.'").
227. See, e.g., Thelen, 238 Mont. at 88-89, 776 P.2d at 524.
228. See supra notes 57-58, 104 and accompanying text (discussing the purposes
of a proximate cause analysis).
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be applied to cases which do not involve intervening causes. In
its analysis of prior case law, the court isolated the 1994 case of
Logan v. Yellowstone County,22 stating that Logan is one case
out of six since Kitchen Krafters that did not involve the foreseeability of intervening causes. ° According to the court's research and holding, then, the facts in cases like Logan do not
require a proximate cause analysis.23 '
The pertinent facts of Logan reveal that Mabel Logan was
discharged from employment with Yellowstone Exhibition/Metra
(Metra) as a switchboard operator. 32 Upon getting a new job
with the Yellowstone County Jail, Logan developed a repetitive
motion injury to her hands.233 She sued Metra in tort, for
breach of their duty to deal fairly and in good faith."s The
court held that "the causal connection between Logan's discharge
from employment and her repetitive motion injury is so remote
that the injury cannot reasonably be described as a foreseeable
result of the discharge from employment three years earlier."23
This language indicates that the court in Logan used a proximate cause analysis to absolve Metra from liability. Applying the
new causation instructions given in Busta, however, it appears
that Metra could easily have been liable for Mabel Logan's injuries. The specific instructions, according to Busta, would have
been: Metra's conduct is a cause of Mabel Logan's motion injury
if it helped produce it and if the injury would not have occurred
without it. 6 The discharge was a cause-in-fact of Mabel
Logan's injury, because she never would have taken the job at
the County Jail and developed her injury if she had not been
discharged.237 In substantially the same manner, Mabel's discharge "helped produce" her injury. As a result, had Busta's new
test been applied to the facts of Logan, a clearly unjust result
would have occurred. After Busta, the same type of unjust result
will likely occur in cases which do not contain appropriate allegations of intervening causes.

229. 263 Mont. 218, 868 P.2d 565 (1994).
916 P.2d at 136.
230. Busta,_ Mont. at -,
916 P.2d at 139 (explaining that in cases without intervening
231. Id. at -,
causes at issue, it is sufficient to instruct only on cause-in-fact).
232. Logan, 263 Mont. at 219-20, 868 P.2d at 566.
233. Id. at 220, 868 P.2d at 566.
234. Id.
235.
Id. at 222, 868 P.2d at 567.
236.
See Busta, __ Mont. at __, 916 P.2d at 139 (stating the cause-in-fact instruction).
P.2d at 567.
237.
Logan, 263atMont.
at 221,of868
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By limiting analysis of proximate cause to cases involving
intervening acts by third parties, the court has removed a necessary causation element from many other cases. As argued in
foregoing sections of this Comment, the proximate cause test is
necessary in all negligence cases because there must be a method for excluding damage too attenuated from the defendant's act
to reasonably justify compensation for this damage.238 So long
as the instruction accurately reflects the law, there is no need to
make fine line distinctions about which cases deserve a proximate cause instruction. In earlier cases, the Montana Supreme
Court supported this point with citation: "The event without
millions of causes is simply inconceivable; and the mere fact of
causation, as distinguished from the nature and degree of the
causal connection, can provide no clue of any kind to singling out
those which are held to be legally responsible."2 9 As well, the
court has stated that "proximate cause is an element of the cause
of action for negligence, and must be proven in order for a plaintiff to recover damages."2 4
Even in the Busta decision, the court recognized the necessity of a limiting element, by citing to the following assertion:
"Once it is established that the defendant's conduct has in fact
been one of the causes of the plaintiffs injury, there remains the
question whether the defendant should be legally responsible for
the injury."241 Problematically, the Montana Supreme Court
failed to reconcile these cited assertions with its removal of the
proximate cause element from many negligence cases as a result
of the Busta decision. As proposed in Part V of this Comment, a
better solution would be to remove the foreseeability concept
from the proximate cause test altogether, and to apply the direct
cause test for proximate causation to all negligence cases.
C. Other Concerns About the Busta Decision
In addition to mandating a confusing, unnecessary, and
perhaps unfair determination of which cases deserve a proximate

238. See supra notes 44-48, 57-58 and accompanying text.
239. Thayer, 243 Mont. at 155, 793 P.2d at 795 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET
AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 266 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp.
1988)).
240. Thelen v. City of Billings, 238 Mont. 82, 85, 776 P.2d 520, 522 (1989) (citing Young v. Flathead County., 232 Mont. 274, 282, 757 P.2d 772, 777 (1988)).
241. Busta, _
Mont. at __, 916 P.2d at 137 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 272-76 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp.
1988)).
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cause analysis, the court in Busta also left unspecific guidelines
for the future application of the duty element and the substantial factor test. In its discussion of the duty element, the court
did not adequately define the role of the element as it relates to
the entire negligence equation. The court seemed to approve of
the "general duty" notion when it stated that "[in Ekwortzel...
we declined to apply the foreseeability requirement set forth in
Mang in a manner which would require that the specific accident
which resulted be foreseen .... However, we did, from the time
that Mang was decided until our decision in Kitchen Krafters,
consistently relate the notion of foreseeability to the requirements of duty."24' 2 In this statement, the court traced Montana's
present application of the foreseeability concept to duty, but it
failed to define the future role of duty as being "general" or "specific." This omission is significant because, regardless of the
modification made by the court in the Ekwortzel decision, Mang
has been cited for contradictory notions of general and specific

duty.2 "
Moreover, this treatment does not adequately define the
scope of the limiting nature of the duty element because, according to Busta, there are now two instructions for causation. The
issue that arises is whether the same duty element will be applied to both instructions. If the court is indeed applying the
notion of a "general duty" uniformly, those cases that will require only a cause-in-fact test have lost a necessary limiting
element.2 " It remains to be seen whether the court will apply
different tests for duty to the two different tests for causation. In
conclusion, the court did not adequately consider the necessary
balance between duty and causation as limiting elements when
it changed Montana's law of causation.
The court in Busta also gave the controversial substantial
factor test very cursory treatment. The extent of this treatment
is as follows:
In those cases where there are allegations that the acts of more
than one person combined to produce a result (e.g., when the
plaintiff alleges negligence and the defendant alleges contributory negligence, or when there are multiple defendants), we
acknowledge that the recommended cause-in-fact instruction

242.
243.
244.
limiting

Busta, __ Mont. at __, 916 P.2d at 134.
See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of duty as a
element.
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would be confusing and misleading. Therefore, in those cases,
we recommend continued use of the substantially factor instruction approved in Rudeck v. Wright and Kyriss v. State."
The problem with this holding is twofold. First, the court did not
define the substantial factor test to include "concurring causes"
in the same manner as Rudeck and Kyriss.4 Specifically, the
court did not include preexisting conditions, an accepted concurring cause, but rather limited the substantial factor test to negligent acts.24 7
Second, the court did not specifically overrule that part of
Kitchen Krafters which stated that, regardless of whether the
plaintiff proves cause-in-fact by either the substantial factor test
or the but for test, it then "becomes incumbent on him to move
to the second tier": proximate cause.' The question becomes
whether the substantial factor test will apply in addition to or
instead of a proximate cause analysis in cases that do not involve intervening cause issues.249 Here too, the court did not
offer adequate guidelines for how the new rules of causation will
be applied to existing causation law.
VII. CONCLUSION
Montana has not been unique in its trouble analyzing the
role of causation in negligence. While demonstrating that fundamental principles can be extracted from historical case law and
scholarly opinions, this Comment recognizes the complexity of
the law of causation. This Comment also acknowledges, however,
that workable jury instructions are a necessary part of the law.
In Busta, the Montana Supreme Court stated: "The point we
wish to make is that the only purpose which is properly served
by instructions to the jury is to assure a decision that is consistent with the evidence and the law. This can only be accomplished when the instructions are as plain, clear, concise, and as
brief as possible."25 ° The causation instructions created in the

245.

Busta,

__

Mont. at _,

916 P.2d at 138 (citations omitted).

246. See supra notes 106-15 and accompanying text for a discussion of Montana's
definition of the substantial factor test.
247. See, e.g., Kyriss v. State, 218 Mont. 162, 167, 707 P.2d 5, 8 (1985) (holding
that the patient's preexisting condition concurred with the doctor's negligence).
248. Kitchen Krafters v. Eastside Bank of Montana, 242 Mont. 155, 168, 789
P.2d 567, 574 (1990).
249. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text (suggesting that the substantial factor test should not comprise the entire test for causation).
250.

Busta,

-

Mont. at

__,

916 P.2d at 140.
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Busta decision, however, do not comport with the court's assertion. The instructions are not consistent with either the rules
created by the Busta decision, or the rules contained in precedent that the case did not overturn. Moreover, the differing tests
resulting from the Busta decision will create confusion for Montana judges and practitioners, and such confusion will inevitably
trickle down to juries.
On the other hand, the proposal in Part V of this Comment
demonstrates that causation rules and instructions can be consistent. As well, the proposed instructions in Part V are uniform
in application. In each case, a two-tiered analysis of causation
would be required. With the exception of the particularized situation of concurring causes, the tests within each tier would be
the same in all cases. Moreover, the proposals given in Part V
acknowledge the interplay among all of the negligence elements,
and recognize that a change in one element cannot be made
without scrutinizing the effect on the remaining elements. The
proposed changes would realign Montana's law of causation in a
manner that would be fair to litigants and simple for judges,
juries and practitioners to apply.
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